Administrative Appeal Decision - Pineda, Jose (2019-05-10) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
December 2020 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Pineda, Jose (2019-05-10) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Pineda, Jose (2019-05-10) 2019-05-10" (2020). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/235 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Pineda, Jose Facility: 
·Appeal 
Control No.: 
Woodbourne CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 99-A-6057 
Appearances: Jose Pineda (99A6057) 
Wyoming Correctional Facility 
3203 Dunbar Road, Box 501 
Attica, New York 14011-0501 
10-211-18 B 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Coppola, Davis 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived February 27, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~rm ed. _Vacated, remanded for de novo Interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ed . _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
~murissi _er 
~~~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the se~te findings .of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 'S.Ll...f)//f ~ti . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Cmmsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. 
Appellant is serving a term of imprisonment of 18 years to Life after having been convicted 
by guilty plea of the crime of Murder 2nd.  Appellant shot his roommate in the head causing his 
death. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily upon the 
serious nature of Appellant’s crime of conviction; (2) Appellant’s programming, positive 
accomplishments, certain COMPAS scores, and release plans were not given sufficient 
consideration by the Board; (3) the Board failed to solicit parole recommendations from the 
sentencing judge, district attorney and defense counsel; (4) certain issues were not discussed 
during the interview; (5) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process 
rights, and the doctrine of separation of powers; (6) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a 
resentencing of Appellant; and (7) the Board’s decision lacked sufficient detail. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
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e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
  
As to the third issue, letters soliciting a parole recommendation were sent by the 
Department to the sentencing court, district attorney, and defense counsel. 
            As to the fourth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
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during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on 
parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).  Participation in the shock incarceration program 
is a “privilege.” Correction Law § 867.  Completion of the program permits inmates to be 
considered for parole in advance of their parole eligibility date.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(a).  If parole 
is not granted, inmates are held until their parole eligibility date.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b).  The determination whether to parole inmates who complete the program 
may be made without an interview.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b). 
            There is no merit to Appellant’s separation of powers claim. Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 689 n.4, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436 (1980); Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept. 2001), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 
738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001); cf. Tarter v. State, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (1986). 
As to the sixth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an 
improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine 
the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set 
forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. 
Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant has 
not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).
As to the seventh issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
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N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
